While recent scholarship accents early Franciscans’ use of Greek and Greco-Arabic sources in their ethics, Roger Bacon’s appeal to Stoic ethics via Seneca in his Moralis philosophia, the last book of his Opus maius, has not been given its due. Bacon’s citation of Seneca’s dialogues privileges De ira and works he associates with it. Placing Bacon’s ethics in the context of classical and Christian traditions on anger, this paper argues that Bacon uses Seneca to undermine the (...) arguments for righteous anger in both these traditions, specifically those validated by his Franciscan contemporary John of La Rochelle. Bacon’s alternative addresses ethical and political concerns he shares with his dedicatee, Pope Clement IV, and with Franciscan confrères committed to popular preaching and the apostolate to non-Christians. As such, Bacon’s Stoic ethics à la mode needs clearer recognition in the ongoing reinterpretation of thirteenth-century Franciscan thought. (shrink)

In this volume, John Bacon argues that it is difficult to deny the existence of particularized properties and relations, which in modern philosophy are sometimes called `tropes'. In so doing, he advances a powerful and sophisticated metaphysical theory according to which both ordinary particulars and properties and relations are bundles of tropes.

Supervenience in most of its guises entails necessary coextension. Thus theoretical supervenience entails nomically necessary coextension. Kim's result, thus strengthened, has yet to hit home. I suspect that many supervenience enthusiasts would cool at necessary coextension: they didn't mean to be saying anything quite so strong. Furthermore, nomically necessary coextension can be a good reason for property identification, leading to reducibility in principle. This again is more than many supervenience theorists bargained for. They wanted supervenience without reducibility. It is not (...) always available for this mediating role. (shrink)

Published in 1897, this was the first complete edition of Roger Bacon's influential thirteenth-century encyclopedia of science.

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over (...) recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing. (shrink)

In "Supervenience, Necessary Coextension, and Reducibility" (Philosophical Studies 49, 1986, 163-176), among other results, I showed that weak or ordinary supervenience is equivalent to Jaegwon Kim's strong supervenience, given certain assumptions: S4 modality, the usual modal conception of properties as class-concepts, and diagonal closure or resplicing of the set of base properties. This last means that any mapping of possible worlds into extensions of base properties counts itself as a base property. James Van Cleve attacks the modal conception of property (...) and diagonal closure. To me it seems desperate to reject diagonal closure merely in order to save supervenience-materialism. But I concede that it may be unacceptable in the context of a sparser theory of properties. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of the original artefact. Generally these books are created from careful scans of the original. This allows us to preserve the book accurately and present it in the way the author intended. Since the original versions are generally quite old, there may occasionally be certain imperfections within these reproductions. We're happy to make these classics available again for future generations to enjoy!

The principle of universal instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior’s paradox and Kaplan’s paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. Our assessment (...) of both approaches is largely pessimistic, and we remain reluctantly inclined to take Prior’s and Kaplan’s derivations at face value. (shrink)

1. Anderson and Belnap's most explicit characterization of the fallacy of modality is as follows: "Modal fallacies arise when it is claimed that entailments follow from, or are entailed by, contingent propositions." The view which Nelson attributes to Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand, is "that necessary propositions are entailed only by necessary ones, never by contingent ones." Anderson and Belnap speak of "entailments," whereas Nelson generalizes to "necessary propostitions." The move is far from innocent, as we shall see. (...) For though Anderson and Belnap hold that every true entailment is a necessary proposition, not every necessary proposition is an entailment. In order to grasp the implications of this distinction more clearly, let us see how Anderson and Belnap's statement of the modal fallacy might legitimately be restated in terms of necessity. To that end we must draw a related distinction between necessary propositions and necessity propositions. A expresses a necessary proposition iff A → A → A holds. A expresses a necessity proposition iff A is of the form B → C. The particular form of these definitions is dependent on the fact that entailment rather than necessity is primitive in Anderson and Belnap's system; the forms in parentheses are the equivalents in terms of necessity. Now it follows from these definitions that every entailment is a necessity proposition and that every necessity proposition is an entailment. The modal fallacy may thus be equivalently characterized as the claim that a necessity proposition is entailed by a contingent proposition. That this is different from Nelson's formulation is clear from the following considerations. First, not every necessary proposition is a necessity proposition; example: "Either it is raining or it is not raining." Second, not every necessity proposition is a necessary proposition; example: any false necessity proposition. Thus the possibility is left open that some necessary proposition might be entailed by a contingent one. This is exactly the case with Nelson's example 2, "That every polychromatic surface is red entails that every polychromatic surface is colored." This might well be a theorem in a suitable extension of E. Such cases do not, however, arise among the theorems of EI. In that limited system, all that a contingent proposition can entail is itself. (shrink)

The perceptual logic of j hintikka and r thomason is imbedded in a more general framework of quantification over individual-concepts. two intensional predicates for physical individuation and perceptual individuation are required in place of thomason's two variable-sorts. objectual perception of x by s is then definable as "for some y there is a perceptually individuated object z, in fact identical with x, such that s perceives that y is z.".

Mindsets are shifting where the work areas of the students vary. The class furniture will vary from size and shape of tables, to couches, to a variety of chairs. Students must have the freedom to make choices to take ownership of their learning. This means that mistakes will happen. The classroom should be a comfortable learning environment.

D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...) group of philosophers from the United States, England and Australia. An interesting feature of the volume is that Armstrong himself has written responses to each of the essays. There is also a complete bibliography of Armstrong's writings. (shrink)

First published in the most ambitious international philosophy project for a generation; the _Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. _Logic from A to Z_ is a unique glossary of terms used in formal logic and the philosophy of mathematics. Over 500 entries include key terms found in the study of: * Logic: Argument, Turing Machine, Variable * Set and model theory: Isomorphism, Function * Computability theory: Algorithm, Turing Machine * Plus a table of logical symbols. Extensively cross-referenced to help comprehension and add (...) detail, _Logic from A to Z_ provides an indispensable reference source for students of all branches of logic. (shrink)

My aim has been to adapt Quine's criterion of the ontological commitment of theories couched in standard quantificational idiom to a much broader class of theories by focusing on the set-theoretic structure of the models of those theories. For standard first-order theories, the two criteria coincide on simple entities. Divergences appear as they are applied to higher-order theories and as composite entities are taken into account. In support of the extended criterion, I appeal to its fruits in treating the various (...) examples considered above and to the healthy intuitions of the non-noneists among us. Don't O(m) and E(m) comprise just the things we should have though existed according to a particular interpretation m of a language or a theory? Whatever the answer (and it will hardly be unanimous), I hope to have pointed the way towards a recognition of ontology as a worthwhile branch of modern theory. (shrink)

The rubric “The Late Derrida,” with all puns and ambiguities cheerfully intended, points to the late work of Jacques Derrida, the vast outpouring of new writing by and about him in the period roughly from 1994 to 2004. In this period Derrida published more than he had produced during his entire career up to that point. At the same time, this volume deconstructs the whole question of lateness and the usefulness of periodization. It calls into question the “fact” of his (...) turn to politics, law, and ethics and highlights continuities throughout his oeuvre. The scholars included here write of their understandings of Derrida’s newest work and how it impacts their earlier understandings of such classic texts as Glas and Of Grammatology . Some have been closely associated with Derrida since the beginning—both in France and in the United States—but none are Derrideans. That is, this volume is a work of critique and a deep and continued engagement with the thought of one of the most significant philosophers of our time. It represents a recognition that Derrida’s work has yet to be addressed—and perhaps can never be addressed—in its totality. (shrink)